Afghanistan: a nighmare scenario?
20 november 2009
An interviewer of Der Spiegel asked German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle this week: "Your biggest foreign policy challenge is Afghanistan. How does one work with a president who has stayed in power as a result of election fraud?" This is the question on everybody's mind, now that President Karzai has been inaugurated for a second term of 5 years. Minister Westerwelle responded that we should "make it very clear to the reelected president what we expect from him: good governance and action against corruption. It is precisely because of the many questions about how the election was carried out that President Hamid Karzai must try to be a president for all Afghans. That is what we will demand." In the same vein Hillary Clinton, who was present at the inauguration ceremony, emphasized that "there is now a clear window of opportunity for President Karzai and his government to make a new compact with the people of Afghanistan to demonstrate clearly that they're going to have accountability and tangible results."
The massive election fraud and President Karzai's re-election have changed an already bad mood about our troop commitments to Afghanistan for the worse. The public debate in several troop contributing countries is becoming more critical and vocal. The question "what are we doing there?" is asked frequently and openly. Politician's don't have an answer. Several countries are looking for new, or joint, strategies. Germany is in the midst of a discussion about realistic goals and a joint strategy. President Obama has been consulting his advisors for over two months now and has not made a decision on a way forward. One of his reservations concerns precisely President Karzai. UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown warned that Britain would not continue risking the lives of its soldiers to defend a corrupt regime. An official present in the -so far eight- situation room meetings said that "one of the biggest obstacles in reaching a decision is uncertainty surrounding the credibility of the Afghan government." US Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry publicly opposes sending additional troops and has expressed strong concerns about Karzai's reliability as a partner. This has huge ramifications for the proposed US strategy: how can you do counterinsurgency, protect the population and rebuild the country when there is no-one to hand over to? What are the consequences of having an army without a legitimate civilian government to oversee it and hold it accountable?
Does this mean we should withdraw our troops and leave Afghanistan to sort out the mess by itself? We obviously cannot. According to a Pakistani intelligence official quoted in the International Herald Tribune on President Karzai's inauguration day: "if they leave in haste, like they have done in the past, we will be back to the bad old days. Our jihadis would head back to Afghanistan, reopen training camps, and it will be business as usual." NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen expressed fear of a global jihad, if we withdraw from Afghanistan.
On the other hand, we must recognize the limitations of the military approach. The military can clear an area, perhaps hold it for some time, but it cannot win over the people. It cannot guarantee lasting security. Pakistani troops are encountering the same problem. They have occupied former Taliban strongholds in South Waziristan but the problem is finding a reliable partner. In Afghanistan the problem is compounded by the fact that there are foreign troops. It does not make sense for the Afghan people to shift their loyalty to someone who will leave. To my mind, what is missing in the Afghanistan narrative and in our efforts on the ground, is a political offensive. Diplomacy is certainly the underemphasized D of the so-called 3-D approach. And without political resolve, there is no end in sight to what we are doing in Afghanistan. Any General will tell you this war cannot be won militarily. NATO troops cannot defeat the Taliban and vice-versa. But the point is that the Taliban don't have to defeat NATO. They just have to wait until they leave. That's why they are aiming to weaken our resolve at home. Through causing casualties among western troops. Through provoking civilian casualties among Afghans by western troops. In that sense, they are winning. We need a different strategy. Al-Qaeda has largely disappeared from Afghanistan and moved to Pakistan. And the best way to defeat the Taliban is to create or strengthen a trustworthy alternative: civilian authorities that deliver basic services at all levels. President Obama recently said that his preference "would be not to hand off anything to the next President." Until such time, NATO military efforts should be aimed predominantly at training and targeted operational support. Foreign troops should operate in a less visible way in order to attract less insurgency violence. Meanwhile, civilian efforts should be stepped up, aimed at building good governance, civilian capacity and creating economic opportunities, at the district and provincial levels. Areas where things are going well should receive extra attention -not less- to sustain the gains made. And perhaps it is time to talk about changing the Afghan Constitution to devolve more power to the provinces and districts, and to the legislature, so it can keep a corrupt President in check. President Karzai's inaugural address struck all the right cords and said all the right words but lacked all credibility. Flanked by one of the worst Afghan warlords, who he has appointed vice-president, to me, this looks like a nightmare scenario.







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